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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BRIGHT, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case presents the question whether under the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act an attorney who has successfully 
represented a prisoner in a civil rights action is entitled to 
attorney fees for time spent on the fee petition. This opinion 
appears to be the first in the United States Courts of 
Appeal to address this important question which arises 
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 
particularly S 803d, 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(d). In addition, 
appellant Hernandez seeks an increase in the hourly rate 





On November 11, 1994, Sergio Hernandez, an inmate at 
the State Correctional Institute at Frackville, Pennsylvania, 
suffered serious injuries when his cellmate stabbed him 
multiple times with a razor. Hernandez had warned several 
officers of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections of 
his danger prior to the attack, but the officers failed to take 
reasonable steps to protect him from his cellmate. 
Hernandez filed suit on September 16, 1996, seeking 
damages for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. 
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The district court held a bench trial on May 27, 1997. 
The court granted judgment as a matter of law under Rule 
50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure against several of 
the defendants. On May 30, 1997, after announcing its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court entered a 
$17,500 judgment against defendant Sergeant Andrew 
Kalinowski. Angus R. Love ("Love") represented Hernandez 
throughout the proceedings. Love initially informally 
requested costs and attorney's fees from Kalinowski, but 
Kalinowski rejected the request. Hernandez then formally 
moved the district court to award attorney's fees and costs, 
requesting a total of $22,680.90. 
 
The district court determined that Love was entitled to 
attorney's fees under the traditional auspices of 42 U.S.C. 
S 1988 as a "prevailing party." See Texas State Teachers 
Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791-92 
(1989). The district court noted, however, that the PLRA 
limits fee awards in prisoner cases to those instances where 
"the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an 
actual violation of the plaintiff 's rights . . .." 42 U.S.C. 
S 1997e(d)(1)(A). Thus, the district court examined Love's fee 
request and applied the lodestar analysis to calculate the 
amount of "direct and reasonable" fees. See Rode v. 
Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990). 
Specifically, the district court multiplied (1) the number of 
hours reasonably expended on the action by (2) the 
reasonable hourly rates to reach the "lodestar." See id. 
 
First, the district court determined the applicable 
reasonable hourly rates by applying the statutory scheme 
provided under 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(d)(3), to reach $67.50 for 
Love's out-of-court services and $97.50 for his in-court 
services. Second, the district court calculated the 
reasonable time expended. The court concluded that an 
across-the-board reduction of 10% applied to Love's fees 
because Hernandez did not succeed on his claims against 
two of the defendants. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 
424, 440 (1983) (noting that an overall reduction in the fee 
is appropriate where the plaintiff achieved "only limited 
success"). Furthermore, the district court completely denied 
Love's fees for time spent preparing the fee petition 
concluding that the PLRA did not authorize fees for 
preparing a fee petition. 
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The court ultimately awarded Hernandez a total of 
$10,131.64 to pay Love's fees and $554.00 to pay costs. 
Hernandez appeals this award, challenging both the 
applicable hourly rates and the court's denial of fees 
relating to the fee petition. We give plenary review to the 
statutory construction of the PLRA. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. 
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 746 F.2d 200, 202 (3d Cir. 
1984). 
 
Hernandez argues the district court erred when it denied 
him fees for the time Love spent preparing the fee petition. 
Generally, under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards 
Act of 1976 ("CRAFAA"), 42 U.S.C. S 1988, fees for 
preparing a motion requesting costs and fees, or "fees on 
fees," are recoverable. Hernandez v. George, 793 F.2d 264, 
269 (10th Cir. 1986). The purpose of the CRAFAA is to 
ensure effective access to the judicial process for persons 
with civil rights claims, and to encourage litigation to 
enforce the provisions of the civil rights acts and 
constitutional civil rights provisions. Thus, courts 
consistently have interpreted fee shifting statutes, including 
the CRAFAA, to provide for reasonable fees for all time 
spent in the vindication of statutory or constitutional 
rights, including fees related to the preparation and 
litigation of motions for attorney's fees under the Act.1 
 
The district court concluded, however, that the PLRA 
does not explicitly authorize an award for "fees on fees." 
The relevant portion of the PLRA reads: 
 
       (1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is 
       confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional 
       facility, in which attorney's fees are authorized under 
       section 1988 of this title, such fees shall not be 
       awarded, except to the extent that -- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See, e.g., Student Pub. Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. AT&T 
Bell Labs., 842 F.2d 1436, 1455 (3d Cir. 1988); Prandini v. Nat'l Tea Co., 
585 F.2d 47, 53 (3d Cir. 1978); Glass v. Pfeffer, 849 F.2d 1261, 1266 
(10th Cir. 1988); Hernandez v. George, 793 F.2d at 269; Clark v. City of 
Los Angeles, 803 F.2d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 1986); Lund v. Affleck, 587 
F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1978); Souza v. Southworth, 564 F.2d 609, 614 (1st 
Cir. 1977). 
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       (A) The fee was directly and reasonably incurred in 
       proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's rights 
       protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may 
       be awarded under section 1988 of this title; and 
 
       (B)(I) the amount of the fee is proportionately re lated 
       to the court ordered relief for the violation; or 
 
       (ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in 
       enforcing the relief ordered for the violation. 
 
PLRA S 803(d), 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(d). The district court 
concluded that Congress failed to explicitly provide for fee 
petition awards within the plain language of the PLRA and 





A. Attorney's Fees for Time Spent Preparing the 
Fee Petition 
 
We first examine the language of the statute. Although 
the phrase "fees on fees" appears nowhere within 42 U.S.C. 
S 1997e(d)(1), the PLRA provides for fees which are "directly 
and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of 
the plaintiff's rights" and are either "proportionately related 
to the court ordered relief for the violation; or . . . directly 
and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered 
. . . ." Thus, the key is determining if "fees on fees" are 
included within the meaning of fees "directly and 
reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the 
plaintiff 's rights . . . ." See PLRAS 803(d), 42 U.S.C. 
S 1997e(d)(1). 
 
In our view, fees for time spent in preparing a fee petition 
are included within the meaning of "fee[s] directly and 
reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation .. . ." 
Otherwise the attorney's fee to which he or she is entitled 
by law is in fact diminished. For example, assume a 
plaintiff succeeds on the merits of a civil rights claim and, 
in doing so, incurs $10,000 in "direct and reasonable" costs 
and attorney's fees. That fee represents the attorney's time 
expended. Further assume that the plaintiff's attorney is 
forced to spend an additional $2000 in time to compel the 
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defendant to pay the $10,000 costs and fees owed. If the 
plaintiff is not allowed to recover the "fees on fees," the 
plaintiff would not receive the $2000 to pay the attorney. In 
the case of an impecunious plaintiff, as most prisoners are, 
the end result would be that the attorney would in fact 
receive a fee based on time that is less than that authorized 
by law. To avoid this erosion of an award of attorney's fees, 
courts have traditionally interpreted S 1988 to allow for 
"fees on fees" to guarantee a full recovery of fees. 
 
General rules of statutory construction support reading 
the PLRA to provide for "fees on fees." First, Congress must 
clearly express its intent to change a well-established 
common law construction. Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 
587 (3d Cir. 1966) (en banc). As previously stated, courts 
consistently have construed the Civil Rights Acts to provide 
for "fees on fees" despite the absence of clear Congressional 
directives within those Acts. See Commissioner, I.N.S. v. 
Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (1990) (construing the Equal Access to 
Justice Act to entitle successful plaintiffs to"fees on fees"). 
The language of 42 U.S.C. S 1988(b) provides for fees "[i]n 
any action . . . to enforce a provision of section[ ] . . . 1983 
. . . ." This language which has allowed for"fees on fees" 
does not differ significantly from the language in the PLRA 
authorizing fees for proving an actual violation. In passing 
the PLRA, Congress knew that fee petitions are a necessary 
predicate to a fee award and that the courts have 
interpreted S 1988 to allow for reimbursement for fees for 
the work done on fee petitions. If Congress did not intend 
for attorneys to be fully compensated for their work on civil 
rights claims for prisoners, Congress needed to explicitly 
express an intent to change the established construction 
to authorize the diminishment of actual fees by not 
compensating attorneys for time (which to a lawyer is 
money2) spent proving the right to attorney's fees. 
 
Second, "fees on fees" must be included in 42 U.S.C. 
S 1997e(d)(1) under another rule of statutory interpretation, 
the whole act rule. The whole act rule directs that "[w]hen 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Benjamin Franklin in advice to a young tradesman said, "Remember 
time is money." Bartlett's Familiar Quotations 348 (Emily Morison Beck 
ed., 15th ed. 1980). 
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`interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a 
particular clause in which general words may be used, but 
will take in connection with it the whole statute (or statutes 
on the same subject) and the objects and policy of the law, 
as indicated by its various provisions, and give to it such a 
construction as will carry into execution the will of the 
Legislature . . . .' " Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 
(1974) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 194 
(1857)). "Congress enacted PLRA with the principal purpose 
of deterring frivolous prisoner litigation by instituting 
economic costs for prisoners wishing to file civil claims." 
Lyon v. Krol, 127 F.3d 763, 764 (8th Cir. 1997); see also 
141 Cong. Rec. S14419 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) 
(statement of Sen. Abraham). At the same time, Congress 
preserved the rights of prisoners with valid claims to have 
access to an attorney and seek legal redress for meritorious 
claims by including the provision for attorney fees. This 
case was not frivolous. The result establishes that the 
prisoner's complaint had substantial merit. Nothing in the 
legislative history suggests that Congress intended to deter 
meritorious claims. Thus, an interpretation allowing "fees 
on fees" for meritorious claims serves Congress' intent. 
 
If "fees on fees" are not allowed under the PLRA, 
defendants will have an incentive to refuse to pay fees until 
formally ordered by a court. Defendants would be 
encouraged to create further litigation over fees that they 
rightfully owe to plaintiffs, and parties would be 
discouraged from settling such matters amongst 
themselves. Thus, disallowing plaintiffs to collect "fees on 
fees" would directly contravene the Congressional purpose 
behind the PLRA of minimizing frivolous litigation, and 
preserving judicial resources for meritorious claims. See 
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 ("A request for attorney's fees 
should not result in a second major litigation. Ideally, of 
course, litigants will settle the amount of a fee."). Thus, 
under the whole act rule, Congress must have intended to 
entitle successful plaintiffs to receive "fees on fees." 
 
Within the context generally of Civil Rights Acts awarding 
"fees on fees," the language of the PLRA would seem to 
provide for these types of fees also. In the ordinary civil 
rights case, a prevailing plaintiff has a right to collect 
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attorney's fees and costs. The provisions for fees, for 
example under S 1988, are not self-effectuating. Litigation 
of fee petitions often becomes necessary to enforce that 
right. Similarly in prisoner civil rights cases, in order to 
prevent a defendant from effectively eroding the amount a 
plaintiff and his or her attorney ultimately collect, and to 
minimize unnecessary and frivolous litigation that may 
arise over fee awards, S 1997e(d)(1) of the PLRA must be 
interpreted to include "fees on fees." 
 
B. Appropriate Hourly Rate 
 
The district court correctly determined that the applicable 
hourly rates are $97.50 for in-court work and $67.50 for 
out-of-court work for attorney Love. According to 42 U.S.C. 
S 1997e(d)(3), the "reasonable" hourly rate for prisoner civil 
rights litigation cannot be "an hourly rate greater than 150 
percent of the hourly rate established under section 3006A 
of Title 18, for payment of court-appointed counsel." Id. 
Section 3006A(d)(1) of Title 18 establishes rates of $60 per 
hour for in-court time and $40 per hour for out-of-court 
time "unless the Judicial Conference determines that a 
higher rate of not in excess of $75 per hour is justified for 
a circuit . . . ." The rate established in the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania is $65 per hour for in-court time and $45 
per hour for out-of-court time for court-appointed counsel. 
Thus, applying the 150% maximum, the appropriate rates 
are $97.50 for Love's in-court services and $67.50 for 
Love's out-of-court services. 
 
Hernandez claims that Love should be reimbursed at a 
rate of $187.50 based on the amount provided under 21 
U.S.C. S 848(q)(10)(A) for court-appointed counsel in capital 
cases.3 Hernandez argues that PLRA sets an hourly cap on 
attorney's fees set out at 18 U.S.C. S 3006A and the most 
logical reading of the statute would be to look at the highest 
rate allowed under S 3006A. Hernandez contends that 
S 3006A references a plan created by district courts and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Kalinowski argues that this argument should be rejected because 
Hernandez did not raise the argument at the district court. We note that 
this court ordinarily does not entertain issues raised for the first time 
on 
appeal. See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1211 n.25 (3d Cir. 1996). 
Nevertheless, we will decide this argument on its merits. 
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that 21 U.S.C. S 848 states that the plan can authorize 
payments to attorneys who represent defendants in capital 
cases in an amount exceeding that provided in S 3006A. We 
reject Hernandez's argument. 18 U.S.C. S 3006A does not 
cross-reference 21 U.S.C. S 848 and the statutes on their 
face are independent of one another. The plain reading of 
18 U.S.C. S 3006A(d)(1) establishes the hourly rate for 
court-appointed attorneys in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, per adjustment by the United States Judicial 
Conference, at $65 per hour for in-court time and $45 per 
hour for out-of-court time. 
 
Alternatively, Hernandez argues that the applicable rate 
for Love's time should be $112.50 an hour. He argues that 
the United States Judicial Conference recently adjusted the 
rates in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to $75 per 
hour for both in- and out-of-court time, and applying the 
150% limitation results in a rate of $112.50. We disagree 
with Love. Due to federal budgetary constraints, that rate 
was not yet implemented at any time during this litigation. 
Thus, we conclude the rates of $65 and $45 remain in force 
and apply in this case, and applying the 150% maximum, 
the appropriate rates are $97.50 for in-court services and 




For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court 
with respect to the hourly rate it used to calculate Love's 
reasonable fees. We reverse and remand to the district 
court with instructions to award Hernandez costs and fees 
for Love's time spent preparing and litigating the fee 
petition, including the reasonable time spent to appeal this 
issue. 
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COWEN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in 
part. 
 
I join in Part II.B of the majority's opinion, which 
establishes the hourly rate for court-appointed attorneys in 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania during the time period 
at issue in this case. Nonetheless, I am constrained to 
dissent from Part II.A of the majority opinion since I believe 
that attorney's fees and costs associated with the 
preparation and litigation of a fee application are not 
recoverable under the PLRA because they are not "directly 
and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of 
the plaintiff's rights . . . ." 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(d)(1)(A). I 
would therefore affirm the district court's judgment in all 
respects. 
 
Title 42 U.S.C. S 1988(b) provides that in federal civil 
rights actions "the court, in its discretion, may allow the 
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable 
attorney's fee as part of the costs." Although this statute 
does not explicitly authorize the recovery of attorney's fees 
for time spent in preparing and litigating a fee petition, we 
have consistently held that such fees are recoverable under 
section 1988 and other similar fee-shifting provisions. See, 
e.g., Student Pub. Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. 
AT & T Bell Labs., 842 F.2d 1436, 1455 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(Clean Water Act); David v. City of Scranton, 633 F.2d 676, 
677 (3d Cir. 1980) (Section 1988); Prandini v. Nat'l Tea Co., 
585 F.2d 47, 53 (3d Cir. 1978) (Title VII). In Prandini, we 
reasoned that such an award was justified because 
 
       the time expended by attorneys in obtaining a 
       reasonable fee is justifiably included in the attorney's 
       fee application, and in the court's fee award. If an 
       attorney is required to expend time litigating his fee 
       claim, yet may not be compensated for that time, the 
       attorney's effective rate for all the hours expended on 
       the case will be correspondingly decreased. Recognizing 
       this fact, attorneys may become wary about taking Title 
       VII cases, civil rights cases, or other cases for which 
       attorney's fees are statutorily authorized. Such a result 
       would not comport with the purpose behind most 
       statutory fee authorizations, Viz, the encouragement of 
       attorneys to represent indigent clients and to act as 
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       private attorneys general in vindicating congressional 
       policies. 
 
585 F.2d at 53 (citations omitted). 
 
However, the broad language of section 1988 must now 
be read in conjunction with the PLRA, which took effect on 
April 26, 1996. Consequently, in prisoner civil rights cases, 
attorney's fees "shall not be awarded, except to the extent 
that . . . the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in 
proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's rights protected 
by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under 
section 1988 of this title . . . ." 42 U.S.C.S 1997e(d)(1)(A). 
 
Contrary to the majority's holding, I believe that the 
attorney's fees and costs associated with preparing and 
litigating a fee petition are not "directly and reasonably 
incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's 
rights protected by a statute . . . ." Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly observed that attorney-fee 
determinations are "collateral to the main cause of action 
and uniquely separable from the cause of action to be 
proved at trial." Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 
277 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196 (1988) 
("[W]e think it indisputable that a claim for attorney's fees 
is not part of the merits of the action to which the fees 
pertain. Such an award does not remedy the injury giving 
rise to the action . . . ."); White v. New Hampshire Dep't. of 
Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1982) ("Nor can 
attorney's fees fairly be characterized as an element of 
`relief ' indistinguishable from other elements. Unlike other 
judicial relief, the attorney's fees allowed under S 1988 are 
not compensation for the injury giving rise to the action."). 
Thus, when Congress distinguished in the PLRA between 
work on the merits and work on fees, it was following a 
path already well-marked by the courts. Work on a fee 
petition is not work done "in proving an actual violation of 
. . . rights" within the meaning of section 1997e(d)(1)(A), 
and the district court was correct to disallow any such fees. 
I must respectfully dissent on this issue. 
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